Why the EU is needed in Mali

Some of the conditions fuelling the food crisis in Mali are connected to recent international actions.

You reported that the European Commission humanitarian-aid department is warning of an “imminent and ‘major’ disaster unless security improves’ in northern Mali (“EU warns of disaster in northern Mali”, 12 April). 

Sadly, some of the conditions now fuelling the food crisis in Mali and its neighbours are connected to recent international actions. Beyond climatic factors, the conflict in Libya displaced large numbers of civilians towards already food-vulnerable countries in the Sahel.

The 2012 Tuareg rebellion and subse-quent military coup in Mali are also part of the unfolding ‘Libyan domino’. In recent days, the west African regional grouping, ECOWAS, has been widely commended for its unusually assured handling of the coup, culminating on 12 April in the hand-over of power by the military to civilians.

Some EU commentators hold up the successful regional mediation as vindi-cation of the EU’s focus on strengthening African security and crisis-response capa-cities. Such commendations ring hollow.

First, the NATO coalition led by the UK and France largely ignored the concern of regional actors like the African Union on the potential destabilisation of the region by the Libya campaign. Such fears now seem justified. The Tuareg rebellion has its root in the southward flow of arms and combatants from Libya. Terrorist and other destabilising forces in the Sahel have also been strengthened as a result.

Second, and this point is closely connected, the EU’s strategy for security and development in the Sahel, reaffirmed by EU foreign ministers on 23 March, now has gaping holes. The strategy could benefit from fundamental revisions.

Thirdly, the EU strategy aims to help restore the state’s authority over contested zones and ungoverned territories. In northern Mali, the prospect for a swift restoration of central authority now appears distant, since the Tuareg rebellion has delivered the region to a Taliban-like coalition of nationalists and jihadists.

Finally, the strategy prioritises Mali, Mauritania, Algeria and Niger. However, challenges not previously envisaged have emerged. These include Boko Haram, the Islamist sect based in north-eastern Nigeria. Regional intelligence agencies have recently reported sightings of Boko Haram militants fighting alongside Malian rebels and jihadi forces.

To prevent an Islamist takeover, the EU should fully support the proposed creation of a hybrid African and UN force to protect Mali’s transitional admini-stration. France and its Libyan allies must go beyond pledging logistical support.

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Finally, EU development co-operation suspended after the coup should be restored. Without it, poverty-ridden Mali has no chance at stability.

Oladiran Bello

Fride (Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior)

Madrid